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The Natural Gas Trade Between the Russian 
Federation and the European Union: Power 
Dynamics, Legal Challenges, and a Country 
Caught in the Middle 
 
By Justin Clune* 
 
Abstract: The European energy sector is a fragile framework that requires foreign 
imports to support domestic production.  Natural gas and petroleum imports from 
Russia are crucial to the vitality of the European Union’s economy.  This Note 
addresses both the attempts made to secure the future of these imports as well as the 
mitigating factors that have occurred recently that have threatened the flow of trade.  
Assessing the legal challenges brought against Russian energy companies, expansion 
of the Russian natural gas trade to China, and the upheaval in Ukraine, this Note 
looks at the strategic interests in play and how the European Union and Russia have 
come to such a dramatic standoff.  With the end result of many of these issues still 
uncertain as of this writing, this Note assesses possible tactics that Russia and the EU 
may employ moving forward and the consequences such tactics may have on the 
energy trade. 
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from fiction in my research, and the cast and crew of the Wigmore Follies for keeping my spirits high 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the summer of 2013, an assessment of the natural gas trade between 
the Russian Federation (Russia) and the European Union (the EU) would 
have been straightforward.  The resource imbalance, unchecked nature of 
Russia’s gas giant, Gazprom, and political capital of Russia created a 
landscape in which the EU had little room to negotiate for its market or 
nonmarket interests.  Since then, the EU’s growing worry over Russia’s 
inefficient management of its resources, a probe launched by the European 
Commissioner for Competition (the Commission), judgments in European 
courts regarding Russia’s handling of the Yukos Oil Company, and political 
upheaval in Eastern Europe have radically reshaped the landscape for the 
natural gas trade, thereby threatening Russia’s bargaining advantage when 
dealing with its western neighbors.  In the wake of such changes, the pieces 
of which are shifting daily, this Comment will examine (1) the situation as 
it existed in the summer of 2013; (2) the major developments in the shifting 
political, economic, and trade patterns of the last year; and (3) Russia and 
the EU’s future prospects with regard to this trade. 
 
II.  THE EUROPEAN ENERGY LANDSCAPE AS IT EXISTED 
 
A.  The Natural Gas Landscape 
 
The energy landscape involves finding natural resources and 
transforming them into usable energy.1  Energy is used in the following 
four primary sectors: electricity generation, industrial, transportation, and 
residential/commercial.2  Current EU member states used 3,094 terawatt 
hours of electricity in 2011.3  In the industrial sector, EU Member States 
consumed, in megatonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), 291.59 Mtoe in 2010.4  
In the transportation sector, the EU member states used 365.22 Mtoe.5  In 
the residential/commercial sector, Europe as a continent used 23 million 
British thermal units (BTUs) per person, a figure that is expected to slowly 
 
 1 FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (Univ. Casebook 
Series, 3d ed. 2010). 
 2 EXXONMOBIL, THE OUTLOOK FOR ENERGY: A VIEW TO 2040 9 (2013), http://www.globaloil 
watch.com/reports/exxonmobil-energy-outlook-2013.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
 3 Electric Power Consumption (kWh), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
EG.USE.ELEC.KH (last visited Oct. 6, 2014) (compiled from 2011 data; “Electric Power Consumption 
measures the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants less transmission, 
distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants”). 
 4 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU TRANSPORT IN FIGURES 115 (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/ transport/facts-
fundings/statistics/doc/2012/pocketbook2012.pdf. 
 5 Id. 
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decrease as energy efficiency increases in the future.6  (See table below for 
comparative values.) 
 




Residential/Commercial (includes electrical 
consumption for such industries) 1.232E+19 
 
Energy in the EU comes from solid fuels, particularly coal, oil, gas, 
electricity, and renewable energy.8  In 2010, EU member states used 279.97 
terawatt hours of solid fuel energy, 617.09 terawatt hours of oil energy, 
441.80 terawatt hours of gas energy, 236.53 terawatt hours of nuclear 
energy, and 172.14 terawatt hours of renewable energy as computed by 
total Gross Inland Consumption.9 (See graph below for comparison). 
 
 
Given the current emphasis on reducing energy consumption due to 
environmental concerns, Europe has oriented its energy policy to cut 
consumption in many sectors.10  Reductions in fuel usage can be achieved 
 
 6 BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 13. 
7 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU TRANSPORT, supra note 4, at 115; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Unit Conversion 
Factors, SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS (2001), http://www.spe.org/industry/unit-conversion-
factors.php. 
 8 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU TRANSPORT, supra note 4, at 111, 115. 
 9 Id. at 115. Consumption by percentage equates to 16% solid fuel energy, 35.3% oil energy, 25.3% 
gas energy, 13.5% nuclear energy, and 10% renewable energy consumption. Id. 
 10  See Energy Efficient Europe, EUROPEAN COMM’N (June 22, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
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through greater efficiency,11 reduction in waste, and decreased consumer 
demand. 
Russia is the natural source of fuel production for the EU because it 
has the largest proven supply of natural gas reserves.12  In contrast, the EU 
member states have much lower natural gas production, and such 
production has been steadily declining due to exhaustion of natural 
resources and uneconomical potential for production.13  The EU imports 
approximately 64% of its natural gas, a percentage that is expected to grow 
in the foreseeable future.14  In 2012, Russia accounted for 34% of the EU’s 
natural gas imports and about one quarter of its total supply.15 
Russia’s success in natural gas export depends, in large part, on the 
security of its pipeline transmission system.  With notable exceptions, 
almost all existing operational pipelines run through either Ukraine or 
Belarus, two former republics of the Soviet Union that became independent 
in 1991.16  Currently, pipelines flowing from Russia through Ukraine have a 
capacity of 142 billion cubic metres (bcm) while pipelines from Russia 
through Belarus have a capacity of 38 bcm.17  Russia’s main export 
competitors for the EU market are Norway, Algeria, Qatar, and Central 
Asia, although the United States is poised to potentially become a player in 
the market as transmission technology is developed to facilitate 
transportation.18  Ultimately, non-European competitors must first secure 
transmission access to the EU to increase their energy exports to the EU. 
In 2012, Gazprom, the largest exporter of Russian natural gas and the 
subject of imminent legal action by the Commission, produced 74.4% of 
Russia’s natural gas supply and 13.6% of worldwide natural gas supply.19  
Gazprom exports about half of its 7.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to EU 
member states, with the remaining exports going to former Soviet states, 
 
news/energy/110622_en.htm. 
 11  See Lorna A. Greening et al., Energy Efficiency and Consumption – The Rebound Effect – A 
Survey, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 389 (2000). 
 12  Keith Kohl, OPEC and Russia‘s Greatest Fear: Losing Their Energy Weapon, ENERGY & 
CAPITAL (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/opec-russia-fear/1450. 
 13  Eurostat, Energy Production and Imports, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports (last modified Sept. 5, 2014). 
 14  MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42405, EUROPE’S ENERGY SECURITY: 
OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES TO NATURAL GAS SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf.  The EU Commission forecasts 80% of natural gas 
consumption in Europe will be imported in 2030.  Id. 
 15  Id. at 6. 
 16  Major Gas Pipelines of the Former Soviet Union and Capacity of Export Pipelines, E. EUROPEAN 
GAS ANALYSIS, http://www.eegas.com/fsu.htm#Tab (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). 
 17  Id. 
 18  RATNER, supra note 14, at 2–4, 6. 
 19  GAZPROM, GAZPROM IN FIGURES 2008-2012 FACTBOOK 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/55/477129/gazprom-reference-figures-2008-2012-eng.pdf. 
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Turkey, and other small import markets.20  While Russia hopes to 
eventually diversify its exports to include burgeoning markets in Asia,21 it 
is currently very dependent on natural gas revenues from the EU; similarly, 
the EU is very dependent on Russia’s natural gas supply. 
The positions of Belarus and Ukraine towards Russian natural gas 
pipelines have posed political and economic advantages and risks to the 
Russian natural gas export industry.  Belarus is a former Soviet state with 
strong ties to Russia.22  Russia and Belarus codified their united interests in 
the 1999 signing of the Agreement on Establishment of a Union State of 
Belarus and Russia, which established a supranational entity consisting of 
only Russia and Belarus.23  Ukraine, also a former Soviet state, has a 
population that is divided between its western half⎯pro-European, 
Ukrainian speaking, tourism and agrarian driven⎯and its eastern 
half⎯pro-Russian, Russian speaking, and industrial.24  This tension has 
birthed a transformative political discussion that includes radical statements 
by Russian President Vladimir Putin  (e.g., Ukrainian accession to the 
World Trade Organization could provide a platform for Russian annexation 
of eastern Ukraine).25  Ultimately, the stability of Belarus and Ukraine and 
the susceptibility of those nations to Russian influence are of critical 
importance to Russian export dominance in the EU energy market, as these 
nations control the transmission of energy to the EU. 
In relation to the natural gas trade, Russia has categorized former 
Soviet states on its borders, including Belarus and Ukraine, as part of 
Russia’s “sphere of privileged interest.”26  Russia has used its dominant 
energy position and existing transmission infrastructure to its political and 
economic gain with regard to this sphere.  For instance, Russia provided 
Ukraine a two-thirds discount on natural gas prices for ten years in 
exchange for a renegotiation of the withdrawal of Russian Black Sea fleet 
 
 20  RATNER, supra note 14, at 9. 
 21  Id. at 11; see Elena Mazneva, Gazprom Says China Natural Gas Deal Delayed to Putin’s May 
Visit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-22/gazprom-says-china-
natural-gas-deal-delayed-to-putin-s-may-visit.html (discussing Gazprom’s failure to close a 30-year 
natural gas contract with China, but optimistically predicting that the deal will be closed in 2014). 
 22  See Helena Yakovlev Golani, Two Decades of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine (European Forum at the 
Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.ef.huji.ac.il/publications/ 
Yakovlev%20Golani.pdf. 
 23  Russia and Union State, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS, 
http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 24  See Stephen Mulvey, Analysis: Divided Ukraine, BBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4043315.stm. 
 25  Юрий Стець, Impyerskiye Komplyeksy Brat’yev Rossiyan ili Nye Mechitye Bisyev pyeryed 
Svin’yami [The Imperial Complexes of Our Russian Brothers or Don’t Throw Pearls Before Pigs], 
UKRAINSKAYA PRAVDA (July 3, 2008), http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2008/07/3/ 3482506/ (Ukr.).  
 26  RATNER, supra note 14, at 11. 
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in formerly Ukrainian Crimea from the original withdrawal date of 2017 to 
one in 2042.27 
However, despite Russia’s strong ties to and economic codependence 
on its eastern Slavic-speaking neighbors, the transmission of natural gas 
from Russia to the EU has undergone notable periods of crisis when 
relations were frayed between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.  In 2005, for 
example, Russia accused Ukraine of domestically using gas that was 
intended for the EU without actually paying for it.28  In response, Gazprom 
froze exports of natural gas through the Ukrainian pipelines, which caused 
shortages in the EU member states that depend on the gas, until Ukraine 
and Russia could agree on a new deal.29  Similar reductions occurred in 
2009 over alleged debts owed by Ukraine to Gazprom.30  While tensions 
have continued to simmer intermittently between Russia and Ukraine, the 
replacement of pro-Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, born in 
Ukrainian-speaking Sumy Oblast,31 with pro-Russian President Viktor 
Yanukovych, born in the Russian-speaking industrial center Donetsk 
Oblast,32 reoriented Ukrainian policy with regard to Russia.  In 2007, 
Belarus also underwent problems relating to the oil pipeline, Druzhba, 
when Russia accused Belarus of siphoning oil marked for EU 
consumption.33 
 
B.  The Petroleum Landscape 
 
While only Russia’s state-controlled natural gas supplier, Gazprom, is 
implicated in the current antitrust investigation by the EU, Russia and the 
EU have a similarly codependent relationship with regard to petroleum 
imports.  The EU has extremely limited oil reserves, which comprise less 
than 9% of its total crude oil supply.34  Therefore, the EU must import a 
 
 27  Id. at 11–12. 
 28  Ukraine ‘Stealing Europe’s Gas,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/europe/4574630.stm. 
 29  Miriam Elder, Behind the Russia-Ukraine Gas Conflict, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2009), 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2009/gb2009013_045451.htm. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Profile: Viktor Yushchenko, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
4035789.stm. 
 32  Stuart Williams, Ukraine’s ‘Orange Villain’ Seeks Last Laugh, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6973451/Ukraines-Orange-villain-seeks-last-laugh.html. 
 33  Russia Oil Row Hits Europe Supply, BBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/business/6240473.stm. 
 34  Registration of Crude Oil Imports and Deliveries in the European Union, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
(2012), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm (accessed by downloading  
“Monthly and Cumulated Crude Oil Imports (Volumes and Prices) by EU and Non EU Country” and 
opening file “eu-coi-2011-01-12”). 
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large majority of its crude oil supply.35  The EU imports about 27.95% of 
its crude oil supply from Russia, the majority of which comes from the 
Urals.36  Like the natural gas market, the oil market in Russia is dominated 
by a single state-controlled company, Transneft, which transports 90% of 
the oil produced in Russia.37  Transneft is even less privatized than 
Gazprom; the Russian government holds 78.1% of Transneft shares38 as 
opposed to over 50% of Gazprom’s shares.39  Russia’s oil pipelines to the 
EU also traverse Ukraine and Belarus in the same way that its natural gas 
pipelines do; therefore, these pipelines present similar risks to the oil export 
industry. 
 
C.  EU Domestic Supplies 
 
In 2007, the Commission published an “Energy Policy for Europe” 
that proposed the radical integration and regulatory control of EU member 
states’ energy-production industries to increase efficiency and stymie the 
growing dependence on energy imports.40  In 2010, renewable energy 
accounted for about 12.4% of EU member states’ final energy 
consumption41 despite repeated efforts to promote immediate and 
significant growth in energy production using renewables.42  Renewable 
sources of energy include biomass, hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal 
power.43 
Domestically produced nuclear power accounts for approximately 
30% of all electricity generated in the EU.44  Nuclear power in the EU is 
governed by the Euratom Treaty, which sets high standards to ensure 
 
 35  EU Crude Oil Imports, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/ 
oil/import_export_en.htm.  
 36  EUROPEAN COMM’N, Registration of Crude Oil Imports, supra note 34. 
 37  Company, TRANSNEFT, http://en.transneft.ru/company/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 38  Update 2-Russia to Reduce Transneft Stake in 2014, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/russia-transneft-results-idUSL5N0D515B20130418 (stating 
that Russia intends to reduce its ownership share to as low as 75% in the near future). 
 39  Shares, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/ (last updated May 8, 2014). 
 40  Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament: An 
Energy Policy for Europe, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0001&from=EN. 
 41  The Contribution of Renewable Energy Up to 12.4% of Energy Consumption in the EU27 in 2010, 
COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS. (June 18, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-12-
94_en.htm. 
 42  See EU Renewable Energy Policy, EURACTIV (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/energy/ 
eu-renewable-energy-policy/article-117536 (setting a goal of 20% of energy production based on 
renewables). 
 43  See Dawn Stover, The Myth of Renewable Energy, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Nov. 
22, 2011), http://thebulletin.org/myth-renewable-energy. 
 44  Nuclear Energy, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/nuclear-energy 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
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nuclear power remains a safe, clean source of power for EU member 
states.45  However, budget problems have stemmed a rapid shift towards 
nuclear power in the EU as the mammoth overhead costs of reactor 
construction have cut the legs out from under even the best planned 
projects.46  Moreover, in reaction to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
disaster47 that has caused immense political, economic, and environmental 
problems for Japan since 2011, Germany has implemented a policy that 
involves immediate shutdown of several reactors and a planned exit from 
the nuclear energy sector by 2022.48  France, one of the world leaders in 
nuclear power production, elected Francois Hollande as its President in 
2012 on a campaign promise to reduce nuclear energy production in France 
by up to a third by 2025.49  Finally, some EU economic powerhouses, such 
as Spain and Italy, are committed to permanent avoidance of nuclear 
power.50 
Overall, as February 2013 drew to a close, the energy relationship 
between Russia and the EU was, in a word, stable.  Russian state energy 
providers Gazprom and Transneft had dominant market positions that 
seemed unlikely to be challenged by competitors in any significant way.  
While the business practices of these companies remained troublesome to 
EU market regulators, the EU did not possess any leverage to challenge 
Russia in an appreciable manner.  The EU also did not possess a forum to 
address its concerns in a binding manner, and it appeared unlikely that the 
EU would be able to exert sufficient pressure to influence anything more 






 45  Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 
OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:084:0001:0112:EN:PDF. 
 46  James Kanter, In Finland, Nuclear Renaissance Runs into Trouble, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/business/energy-environment/29nuke.html?ref=global-
home&_r=0. 
 47  Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Sept. 2014), http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 
info/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident/.  On March 11, 2011, a major earthquake 
struck near Japan and triggered a tsunami, which disabled the power supply and cooling for three 
reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power plant, thereby resulting in the meltdown of those three 
cores.  The efforts to contain radiation in the area and the resulting evacuations were largely covered in 
the news for the next few years. 
 48  Annika Breidthardt, German Government Wants Nuclear Exit by 2022 at Latest, REUTERS (May 
30, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/30/us-germany-nuclear-idUKTRE74Q2P120110530. 
 49  Henry Sokolski, Nuclear Power Goes Rogue, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://mag.newsweek.com/2011/11/27/post-fukushima-nuclear-power-changes-latitudes.html. 
 50  Id. 
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III.  CHANGING MARKETS 
 
A.  The Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 
 
In March 2013, Russia and the Commission signed the most 
comprehensive energy-roadmap agreement ever coordinated between the 
parties: the Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 (Roadmap 
Agreement).51  The Roadmap Agreement memorialized the parties’ intent 
to work towards a pan-European energy space by 2050,52 which would 
provide Russia with market security within European energy markets while 
simultaneously addressing the EU’s goal of bringing Russian companies in 
line with the EU’s business standards.53  The structure of the Roadmap 
Agreement speaks to the following areas in which the EU focused its 
pressure to influence reform of the Russian energy providers: (1) building a 
functioning, integrated network infrastructure; (2) establishing open, 
transparent, efficient, and competitive markets; (3) ensuring energy 
security; and (4) conforming to the goals of sustainable development.54 
 
1.  Functioning, Integrated Network Infrastructure 
 
The development of a functioning, integrated network infrastructure as 
the first tenet of EU–Russian energy relations reflects the EU’s concern 
with the reliability and security of energy trade.55  An integrated EU energy 
network is one that allows for maximum utilization of domestic energy 
sources, including renewables, sufficient interconnections to reach new EU 
member states, a smart grid to ensure maximum energy efficiency, and 
sufficient storage or reverse flow options to get energy where it needs to 
go.56  With regard to all aspects of energy trade between Russia and the EU, 
particularly with respect to natural gas transmission by Gazprom, the 
Roadmap Agreement pushes for greater integration of energy grids and an 
increase in the channels of transmission from Russia to the EU.57  The 
Roadmap Agreement identifies several risks to be mitigated involving 
supply and demand, including (1) anticipating the peaks and troughs of the 
 
 51  Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar. 2013), available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf. 
 52  Id. at 5. 
 53  Id. at 10–11. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 6. 
 56  Priorities for 2020 and Beyond — A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N 2–3 (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0677:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 57  Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, supra note 51, at 10. 
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EU’s gas demand, (2) ensuring stable, secure, and consistent transmission 
through existing and proposed pipeline connections, and (3) coordinating 
the energy infrastructures of member states to be compatible with Russian 
gas export infrastructure.58 
The EU, however, hedges its promises in the Roadmap Agreement by 
leaving itself room to grow its energy markets away from dependence on 
Russian gas and oil if the energy market and technological developments 
make it possible.  For instance, the EU explicitly contemplates reduced gas 
demand consistent with its promotion of domestic energy production, 
including renewables and nuclear power.59  Moreover, the Roadmap 
Agreement highlights political problems that may not have been foreseen or 
contemplated, such as the differing market frameworks and policy 
considerations with regard to EU member states.60  Under the Roadmap 
Agreement, such considerations would be resolved by preexisting and 
contemplated supranational organizations and forums.61 
However, such strategies have historically been insufficient to resolve 
disputes.  In 1994, several former Soviet states and current and future EU 
member states negotiated the Energy Charter Treaty (the Treaty), which 
provided strict standards on energy trade between eastern and Western 
Europe, including Article 27, which outlined a dispute arbitration 
mechanism to deal with conflicts between states or energy companies 
within different states.62  While Russia was instrumental in negotiating the 
Treaty, it failed to ratify the Treaty, and in 2009 Russia ceased to be bound 
by it.63  Following this withdrawal, it became increasingly difficult for EU 
member states to initiate legal action against Gazprom or Transneft for 
activities after 2009.64  Just as the enforcement and dispute resolution 
mechanisms are soft on Russia, the promises of the EU provide only 
superficial assurances to Russian natural gas producers.  For instance, the 
EU’s main commitment with regard to guaranteed demand for Russia’s 
natural gas supply is a promise by the EU to provide Russia with access to 
all official forward-looking natural gas demand assessments.65  Overall, 
neither side is willing to make the strong assurances necessary to institute a 
functioning, integrated network that would solve the long-term issues in the 
 
 58  Id. at 13–14. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 15. 
 62  Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents, ENERGY CHARTER 
(Sept. 2004), available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document /EN.pdf. 
 63  FAQ, ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(accessed by clicking the link, “What is Russia‘s status with the Energy Charter?”). 
 64  Keith C. Smith, Bringing Energy Security to East Central Europe: Regional Cooperation is the 
Key 4, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 2010), available at http://csis.org/files/ 
publication/100402_Smith_BringingEnergySecurity_Web.pdf. 
 65  Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, supra note 51, at 15. 
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2.  Open, Transparent, Efficient, and Competitive Markets 
 
The Roadmap Agreement’s commitment to open, transparent, 
efficient, and competitive markets presents the most significant challenge to 
the status quo energy relationship between the EU and Russia.  Russia’s 
natural gas and oil markets are dominated by single, state-controlled 
entities, and while upstart private Russian competitors have begun to 
increase their market shares,66 they do not possess sufficient market power 
to displace Gazprom and Transneft from their dominant market positions. 
With regard to open markets, as articulated in the “2050 goal” of full 
integration of Russian and EU energy networks, potential challenges loom 
based on the historical animosity between Eastern and Western Europe.  
For instance, Kosovo is widely regarded as a potential candidate for 
eventual EU membership.67  But Kosovo, which in 2008 unilaterally 
declared its independence68 from Serbia, an official EU candidate for 
membership,69 is not currently recognized as a sovereign state by Russia.70  
Kosovo is not currently linked to any oil or gas pipelines and must rely on 
imports by rail or truck, primarily from Macedonia, for its supply.71  If 
Kosove accedes to the EU as part of the Roadmap Agreement, Gazprom in 
support of Serbian interests may be hesitant to link Kosovo to the EU 
energy network.  As exemplified in the situations involving Belarus and 
Ukraine, Russia is not afraid to use its position as a dominant supplier to 
exercise political influence. 
Transparency has long been an issue in EU–Russian energy trade.72  
The Russian energy industry exhibits significant problems with cartel 
management whereby governmental leaders, intelligence officials, and 
favored business oligarchs craft corporate energy policy alongside Russian 
government policymakers to maximize wealth and buy support from 
 
 66  Id. at 13. 
 67  Kosovo, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/kosovo/ (last updated June 27, 2013). 
 68  Kosovo Declaration of Independence, REPUB. OF KOS. ASSEMB. (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635. 
 69  Serbia, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-info 
rmation/serbia/ (last updated June 27, 2013). 
 70  Giorgio Comai, Moscow’s Approach Towards De Facto States After Kosovo‘s Recognition, 
OSSERVATORIO BALCANI E CAUCASO (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Regions-and-
countries/Russia/Moscow-s-approach-towards-de-facto-states-after-Kosovo-s-recognition-140382. 
 71  Energy Regulatory Office, Statement of Security of Supply for Kosovo, ELEC. NATURAL GAS & 
OIL 28, 33 (July 2011), available at http://www.energy-community.org/ pls/portal/docs/1218181.PDF. 
 72  See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (2012), http://cpi.transparency 
.org/cpi2012/results/ (showing that Russia is ranked number 133 in the world in corruption, while 
Belarus and Ukraine, the main transmission intermediaries, are ranked 123 and 144 respectively). 
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western leaders.73  The lack of legal reporting or impartial court systems to 
enforce contractual obligations presents further risks to EU policymakers 
considering opening energy relationships with Russia.74  While many newly 
acceded EU member states are struggling to end corrupt business practices, 
Russia’s energy markets have become more corrupt over time.75 
Russia’s economy has a longstanding practice of bribery, which can be 
an intolerable danger to western companies predicated on a transparent and 
ethically regulated market.76  This norm in Russian business practice can 
cause problems for international companies that might face domestic 
liability for corrupt business practices abroad.77  With energy cartels 
amassing influence at every strata of the Russian political system,78 
building an energy market that conforms to western standards of 
transparency may prove insurmountable in the Russian energy sector.  
While such corrupt business practices have long been linked to companies 
like Gazprom,79 the EU expresses its resolve with regard to enforcing 
anticorruption measures for overt corrupt business practices as well as 
bribery and other more clandestine forms of corruption.80  As the EU moves 
closer to acceptance of principles of corporate social responsibility such as 
the ten principles of the UN Global Compact,81 Gazprom and Transneft 
 
 73  Keith C. Smith, Lack of Transparency in Russian Energy Trade: The Risks to Europe 1-2, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (July 2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/ 
100702_Smith_LackOfTransparency_Web.pdf. 
 74  Id. 
 75  See Margarita M. Balmaceda, Filling a Gap, Filling a Pocket: Absent Institutions, Intermediary 
Companies, and Energy Dependency in the Post-Soviet World (May 2008) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://www.ii.umich.edu/UMICH/ceseuc/Home/ACADEMICS/Research%20Projects/Energy%20Security% 
20in%20Europe%20and%20Eurasia/Balmaceda.pdf. 
 76  Michael Scott, Russia Corruption “May Force Western Firms to Quit,” REUTERS (Mar. 15, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/15/us-russia-corruption-idUSTRE62E1SU20100315. 
 77  Smith, supra note 73, at 2–3; see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions art. 4, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (imposing a duty on signatory states to criminalize the 
bribery of public officials both for offenses that occur within that state and for offenses committed by 
their citizens abroad). 
 78  See, e.g., Cynthia A. Roberts, Russia and the European Union: The Sources and Limits of 
“Special Relationships,” STRATEGIC STUDIES INST. (Feb. 2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute. 
army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=761. “Russia’s autocrats and dominant elites who gain phenomenal 
wealth from their positions of power have a stake in a nontransparent, illiberal Russian state and eschew 
international agreements requiring strict conditionality and accountability.” 
 79  Smith, supra note 73, at 2–5. “[T]hroughout the eight years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, 
Russia’s state-owned natural gas monopoly Gazprom and its subsidiaries Gazpromexport and 
Gazprombank systematically created an elaborate web of opaque companies throughout Europe and 
Russia acting in league with various European partners. . . .  The companies are also believed to be 
linked to Russian and other organized crime groups.” 
 80  See id. at 10–11. 
 81  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
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clearly lag behind in the area of anticorruption and environmental 
responsibility.82 
Energy efficiency is crucial to maintaining a supply of natural gas that 
can serve both Russia’s increasing domestic needs as well as the increasing 
export demand to the EU and potential new markets in Asia.83  In this way, 
a strong cooperative partnership between Russia and the EU benefits both 
parties. The EU desires Russian energy efficiency to ensure an adequate 
supply that meets its energy consumption needs without driving up prices, 
and Russia will profit in the long term if it can reduce natural gas waste due 
to flaring84 and grow its energy revenues by maximizing energy production 
from its current rate of harvesting. 
 
3.  Energy Security 
 
Energy security for the EU means uninterrupted access to energy 
sources at an affordable price.85  Since the EU is a major net importer of 
fuel sources, energy security depends in large part on the dependability of 
the EU’s imports.86  For natural gas, energy security involves having import 
channels from multiple nations, increased storage capacity, and sufficient 
pipeline capacity.87  With a history of conflicts affecting the gas supply 
running through Belarus and Ukraine, energy security has been historically 
low.  However, looking forward, both Russia and the EU have a mutual 
interest in increasing pipeline transmission, including through countries 
other than Belarus and Ukraine.  Meanwhile, the EU has an interest in 
diversifying the countries from which it imports gas by building pipeline 




 82  See The Ten Principles, UN GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/abouttheGC/ 
TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).  “Principle 7: Businesses should support a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote 
greater environmental responsibility; and Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies.  Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all 
its forms, including extortion and bribery.”  Id. 
 83  GEVORG SARGSYAN ET AL., INT’L FIN. CORP. & WORLD BANK, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN RUSSIA: 
UNTAPPED RESERVES 17 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/ connect/de1e58804 
aababd79797d79e0dc67fc6/IFC+EE+in+Russia+Untapped+Potential.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (noting that 
even under the current framework of supply and demand for Russian natural gas, the excess of demand 
will still create increasing shortfalls). 
 84  Id. at 19. 
 85  In-Depth Study of European Energy Security, at 3, COM (2014) 330 final (July 2, 2014), available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20140528_energy_security_study_0.pdf. 
 86  Id. at 5. 
 87  Id. at 8–9. 
 88  Id. at 9. 
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4.  Sustainable Development 
 
The Commission defines sustainable development as “meeting the 
needs of the present generation without jeopardizing the ability of future[] 
generations to meet their own needs – in other words a better quality of life 
for everyone, now and for generations to come.”89  Sustainable 
development typically entails policies that minimize climate change and 
promote low carbon emissions.90  The EU has recently been a prime 
destination for exports of coal from the United States, a fuel source that 
poses among the most severe climate effects91 as well as immediate health 
hazards to human life.92  However, the EU’s push towards renewables is 
intended to stimulate a decrease in demand for coal in the EU starting 
immediately.93 
The EU has sought to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions created by 
coal as an alternative fuel source to gas and in March 2013 issued an 
official communication signaling the EU’s support for Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) technology.94  Implementing CCS on existing and future 
coal-fired power plants would greatly increase the monetary cost of coal as 
a fuel source.95 
Natural gas, while not as environmentally friendly as renewable fuel 
sources, has 60% fewer greenhouse gas emissions than coal in electricity 
generation.96  Gazprom has responded to the EU’s demands for more 
sustainable energy growth by positioning natural gas as the most suitable 
fuel source to be used in conjunction with a shift to a greater use of 
renewables.97  The report, Making the Green Journey Work, specifically 
 
 89  Sustainable Development, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/ (last updated 
July 5, 2013). 
 90  Id. 
 91  Coal, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/coal/ 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
 92  Justin Guay, U.S. Coal Exports Causing Deaths in Europe, SIERRA CLUB (June 14, 2013), 
http://sierraclub.typepad.com/compass/2013/06/us-coal-exports-causing-deaths-in-europe.html. 
 93  John McGarrity, Analysis: EU Coal Demand Starting Decades-Long Slide, REUTERS 
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/30/us-coal-demand-europe-analysis-i 
dUSBRE97T0K120130830. 
 94  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Future of Carbon Capture 
and Storage in Europe, COM (2013) 180 final (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0180:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 95  Carbon Capture and Geological Storage, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/lowcarbon/ccs/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 96  Flipbook, GASNATURALLY, http://www.gasnaturally.eu/ebook/gasnaturallybrochureupdate/index. 
html (last updated Oct. 2012). 
 97  Our Perspectives, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom-mt.com/WhatWeSay/OurPerspectives/Pages/ 
Making-the-Green-Journey-Work.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2013); see also EUROPEAN GAS 
ADVOCACY FORUM, THE FUTURE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS (2011); EUROPEAN GAS ADVOCACY FORUM, 
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assesses how the use of natural gas alongside renewable development 
would allow Europe to reach each of its sustainable development goals 
through 2050.98 
While the Roadmap Agreement offers plans, suggestions, and a 
convenient forum for discussion of the Russian–EU energy trade, its overall 
effect is similar to soft law.  Without an enforcement mechanism to protect 
EU from Gazprom and Transneft’s corporate practices, the EU remains 
powerless to effect real change on Russia’s energy companies.  Seven 
months after this Roadmap Agreement was signed, the Commission found 
that enforcement mechanism to hold Gazprom legally accountable for its 
noncompliance with EU business regulations. 
 
B.  The Commission Probe into Gazprom 
 
On October 3, 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania, European Commissioner for 
Competition Joaquin Almunia announced that the EU was prepared to 
formally charge the Russian state-controlled99 natural gas company, 
Gazprom, with abusing its dominant position in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.100  
The antitrust charges, which are expected to be resolved by the spring of 
2014,101 stem from investigations begun in 2012102 and could result in fines 
of up to 10% of Gazprom’s annual revenue,103 or $15 billion dollars.104 
The EU is built on a capitalist market system whereby competing 
suppliers drive down prices for consumer benefit, and government 
involvement is relegated to regulatory policy for the protection of 
consumers.105  This market structure is incompatible with Gazprom and 
 
MAKING THE GREEN JOURNEY WORK (2011). 
 98  EUROPEAN GAS ADVOCACY FORUM, MAKING THE GREEN JOURNEY WORK 1 (2011). 
 99  Shares, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/ (information current as of Dec. 31, 
2011). 
 100  EU to Charge Gazprom in Antitrust Probe, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/gazprom-eu-probe/25125736.html. 
 101  Nerijus Adomaitis, EU Aims to Complete Gazprom Antitrust Probe by Spring, REUTERS (Nov. 4, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/04/us-eu-gazprom-probe-idUSBRE9A30AQ 20131104. 
 102  Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Gazprom 
(Sept. 4, 2012) (on file with the European Comm’n). 
 103  RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, supra note 100. 
 104  Gazprom Faces $15Bln Antitrust Charges from EU, MOSCOW TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/gazprom-faces-15bln-antitrust-charges-from-eu/ 
487057.html. 
 105  See generally Communication to the Spring European Council: Working Together for Growth 
and Jobs – A New Start for the Lisbon Treaty, at 8, COM (2005) 24 final (Feb. 2, 2005), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0024:FIN:en:PDF (noting the need 
to screen regulatory barriers to competition in the European Union energy market to promote more 
healthy competition). 
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Transneft’s government-controlled and government-sanctioned monopolies.  
Russia actively discourages competitors by directing western businesses 
towards Gazprom and Transneft, which are connected to the most elite of 
cartels.106  Moreover, Russia’s policy of pricing gas exports on an index of 
oil exports allows Gazprom and Transneft to work together to maximize 
their market shares.107  This practice is at the center of the ongoing EU 
investigation into Gazprom’s anticompetitive actions.108 
Anticompetitive practices in the EU’s internal markets are governed 
by Title VII, Chapter 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU).109  While Article 101 of the TFEU more or less mirrors the 
restrictions of the Sherman Act in U.S. law,110 Article 102, on which this 
action is predicated, declares that “any abuse by one or more undertakings 
of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of 
it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between the Member States.”111 
The European Commission will prepare a statement of objections that 
note the anticompetitive practices to which the Commission objects, but it 
is already clear that two of the primary objections are Gazprom’s 
prohibition on resale of natural gas by European buyers and its unfair 
inflation of costs by linking gas prices to oil prices.112 
Ideally, Gazprom would prefer to resolve this matter with a 
commitment decision⎯an expedited and flexible tool of EU competition 
law that allows a legal action to be concluded through a target’s 
 
 106  Smith, supra note 73, at 4. 
 107  Foo Yun Chee, EU Preparing to Charge Gazprom in Antitrust Case, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/03/us-eu-gazprom-idUSBRE9920DV20131003. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101–109, 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN. 
 110  See Antitrust Overview, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview 
_en.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2014); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby is declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
 111  Antitrust Overview, supra note 110 (noting that such abuse may consist of “(a) directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting 
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.”). 
 112  James Kanter & Andrew E. Kramer, Europe Threatens Gazprom with Antitrust Action, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/business/international/europe-threatens-
gazprom-with-antitrust-action.html. 
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acquiescence to demands of the Commission.113  Gazprom would likely be 
amenable to the terms of a commitment decision with regard to the 
prohibitions on resale.114  The Commission alleges that Gazprom included 
“destination clauses,” which are contractual prohibitions on resale of gas to 
other countries.115  Destination clauses are prohibited when the net effect of 
their use creates national submarkets for gas instead of a single EU 
market.116  Gazprom has been investigated for market abuses before and has 
shown willingness to cancel these clauses, which would be the likely effect 
of a commitment letter with regard to this issue.117 
The more divisive issue covered in the action against Gazprom will be 
the linking of natural gas prices to oil prices in long-term gas contracts.  On 
June 27, 2013, Gazprom lost an action in an arbitral tribunal against RWE, 
a German electric utilities company, regarding whether this long-practiced 
method of pricing was allowed.118  Gazprom has extra incentive to avoid an 
adverse ruling on this issue because a clear ruling against oil indexation by 
a Commission tribunal could have strong persuasive authority not only 
throughout Europe, but also in other countries seeking to do business with 
Gazprom.119 
Besides Gazprom’s natural incentive to avoid significant fines in this 
antitrust action, it would be put in a perilous position in the case of an 
adverse ruling.  Gazprom relies on long-term contracts using “take and pay” 
provisions to guarantee enough supply to ensure strong revenues and 
leverage pricing power.120  Having such practices deemed illegal may 
destabilize Gazprom’s European gas sales model with drastic effects for the 
company.  Gazprom  has explicitly favored a settlement to conclude this 
matter throughout this probe.121  As of this time, Gazprom has offered the 
 
 113  See Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States: Functions 
and Risks of a New Instrument of Competition Law Enforcement Within a Federal Enforcement Regime, 
E-COMPETITIONS BULLETIN (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101630) (discussing 
the growing tendency to end all but the most extreme of cartel cases in a commitment decision). 
 114  Nicolò Sartori, The European Commission vs. Gazprom: An Issue of Fair Competition or a 
Foreign Policy Quarrel? (5 Istituto Affari Internazionali, Working Paper No. 13, 2013). 
 115  ALAN RILEY, CEPS POLICY BRIEF No. 285, COMMISSION V. GAZPROM: THE ANTITRUST CLASH 
OF THE DECADE? 8 (2012). 
 116  Sartori, supra note 114. 
 117  See id. 
 118  Richard Power, RWE v Gazprom Export: Is It Open Season on Contract Price Clauses in Gas 
Supply Contracts?, BERWIN LEIGHTON PAISNER (July 16, 2013) http://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-
insights/articles/rwe-v-gazprom-export-is-it-open-season-on-contract-price-clauses-in-gas-supply-
contracts/. 
 119  RILEY, supra note 115, at 9. 
 120  Id. 
 121  EU Says Gazprom Not Yet Satisfied Pricing Concerns, MOSCOW TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/eu-says-gazprom-not-yet-satisfied-pricing-concerns 
/494153.html. 
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EU price concessions, but they have not yet been accepted by the 
Commission.122 
Looking forward, such legal instruments could provide the EU with 
the necessary leverage to effect tangible reform on the Russian energy 
providers.  Many of the allegations against Gazprom also apply to 
Transneft.  Since each member state of the EU could file its own complaint 
to the Commission based on a multitude of practices, the Commission could 
create a real economic incentive for Russian energy companies to avoid the 
worst of its business practices to avoid sanctions by the Commission. 
 
C.  Yukos Oil Legal Proceedings and Arbitration 
 
The Gazprom antitrust investigation was not the only legal action 
initiated against Russia’s energy interests in the last year.  In 2003, Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the owner of Yukos Oil Company (Yukos), a dominant 
player in gas and oil, was arrested on charges of fraud and tax evasion.123  
Seen as a move to seize power, Putin’s arrest of one of the wealthiest 
oligarchs in the country quieted challenges to Putin’s power from other 
wealthy players, most of whom could be charged similarly.124  Following 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest, Russia sought to collect on billions of dollars in 
allegedly unpaid taxes, thereby ultimately freezing Yukos’s assets and 
resulting in Yukos’s sale of its most lucrative assets in an auction.125 
Former majority shareholders in Yukos who were led by Leonid 
Nevzlin, owner of just over 70% of GML Ltd. (the former majority owner 
of Yukos),126 filed a claim based on the Treaty at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.127  On July 28, 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled 
for the claimant shareholders for $50 billion, which was twenty times larger 
than any arbitration ruling ever rendered against a government.128  The 
 
 122  Id. 
 123  Leonid Bershidsky, A $50 Billion Bill for Putin‘s Aggression, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-07-28/a-50-billion-bill-for-putin-s-aggression. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Kavaljit Singh, Khodorovsky and the Yukos Oil Saga: The Investor-to-State Arbitration Is Rigged. Why 
Russia Should Not Honor Tribunal Award of $51 Billion, GLOBAL RESEARCH (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/khodorkovsky-and-the-yukos-oil-saga-the-investor-to-state-arbitration-is-rigged-
why-russia-should-not-honour-tribunal-award-of-51-billion/5393883. 
 126  Courtney Weaver, Leonid Nevzlin Is Biggest Winner from Yukos Ruling at The Hague, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bba18346-1669-11e4-a5c7-00144feab 
dc0.html#axzz3C9Q4eSPN.  
 127  Tim Worstall, Hague Court; Russia Did Steal Yukos and Must Pay $50 Billion Damages, 
FORBES (July 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/07/28/hague-court-russia-did-
steal-yukos-and-must-pay-50-billion-damages/. 
 128  Jennifer Rankin, Russia Ordered to Pay $50bn in Damages to Yukos Shareholders, GUARDIAN (July 
28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jul/28/russia-order-pay-50bn-yukos-shareholders-
khodorkovsky-court. 
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arbiters ruled that Russia had violated Article 13(1) of the Treaty, thereby 
essentially expropriating an industry without providing due 
compensation.129  Russia’s Ministry of Finance announced that it would 
appeal the decision, which it claimed was politically motivated.130  If Russia 
refuses to pay the award, the claimants may pursue Russian sovereign 
commercial assets, including those of Gazprom and Rosneft, through court-
ordered seizures.131  Additionally, the former management of Yukos won an 
award of $2.5 billion from the European Court of Human Rights just three 
days later.132 
While these decisions are a result of a series of legal proceedings 
dating back almost a decade, the timing of the judgments is certainly 
conspicuous.  The arbitration award rendered on July 18, 2014 came just 
one day after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in eastern 
Ukraine.133  The attack, which Russia has been accused of being involved 
in, 134 had been the latest escalation in the Ukrainian conflict discussed in 
Part E. 
 
D.  Proposals for a More Integrated Pipeline Network 
 
Pipeline security poses the most imminent challenge to the Russia–EU 
energy trade.  Energy shortages caused by pipeline shutdowns in Belarus 
and Ukraine not only present a looming threat to the EU’s ability to feel 
secure in their energy supply, but also result in substantial lost profits for 
 
 129  Final Awards Issued in 3 Arbitrations Between Former Shareholders of Yukos and the Russian 
Federation, PERM. CT. OF ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/shownews.asp?nws_id=440&pag_id=1261 
&ac=view (last visited Aug. 31, 2014).  Article 13(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty provides,  
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation . . . except where such Expropriation is: (a) for a purpose which is in the 
public interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out under due process of law; and (d) accompanied by 
the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.” ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE 
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS art. 13, § 1 (2004),  available at 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf. 
 130  Russia to Appeal Against $50bn Yukos Shareholder Payout, BBC NEWS (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28520892. 
 131  Henry Meyer & Stephen Bierman, Yukos Hunting Rosneft Assets from Venezuela to Vietnam, 
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-30/yukos-hunting-rosneft-
gazprom-assets-from-venezuela-to-vietnam.html. 
 132  Gabrielle Steinhauser & Gregory L. White, Russia Must Compensate Yukos Shareholders, Says 
European Court, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/russia-must-compensate-
yukos-shareholders-says-european-court-1406797417. 
 133  Malaysian Airliner Crashes in E. Ukraine near Russian Border, 298 People on Board, RT (July 
17, 2014), http://rt.com/news/173616-malaysian-crash-ukraine-border/. 
 134  Greg Miller, U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet, WASH. POST (July 22, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-discloses-intelligence-on-downing-
of-malaysian-jet/2014/07/22/b178fe58-11e1-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html. 
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Russia.  Both parties have a strong interest to mutually plan for pipeline 
construction that avoids these volatile and economically depressed 
countries.135 
The first major pipeline project inaugurated in response to this 
problem was the Nord Stream pipeline.136  This pipeline runs underneath 
the Baltic Sea and connects Russian suppliers directly with the EU via 
Germany.137  The pipeline completed its final planned stage of construction 
in August 2012138 although feasibility studies are in the works for a third or 
fourth stage of the pipeline in the coming years.139 
Access to southern EU member states through new pipelines has 
presented a more daunting challenge.  Announced in June 2007, the South 
Stream connects Russian pipelines directly to southeastern EU member 
states through the Black Sea.140  Unlike the Nord Stream, which passes 
through only Russian and EU territorial waters, the South Stream pipeline 
passes through Turkish territorial waters to avoid further conflicts with 
Ukraine, which borders the Black Sea to the north.141  However, the South 
Stream pipeline originally competed directly with alternative pipeline 
projects through Turkey that bypassed Russia.142  The Trans Anatolian Gas 
Pipeline (TANAP) is a planned pipeline project that would transport gas 
from Azerbaijan through Turkey to the EU.143  Likewise, the Nabucco 
pipeline was proposed to connect gas sources from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, 
and Turkmenistan to the EU through Turkey, thereby delivering gas supply 
through the Nabucco-West Pipeline to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and 
 
 135  RATNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 2. 
 136 Controversial Project Launched: Merkel and Medvedev Open Baltic Gas Pipeline, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/controversial-project-
launched-merkel-and-medvedev-open-baltic-gas-pipeline-a-796611.html. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Gazprom Completes Nord Stream‘s 2nd Pipeline, RIA NOVOSTI (Aug. 2012), http://en.ria.ru/ 
business/20120829/175503578.html. 
 139  Nord Stream Seeks to Study Estonian Economic Zone in Baltic until 2015, KYIVPOST (Aug. 27, 
2012), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/nord-stream-seeks-to-study-
estonian-economic-zone-in-baltic-until-2015-312086.html. 
 140  Nadia Rodova, Russia, Bulgaria Sign Final Investment Decision on South Stream Gas Pipeline, 
PLATTS MCGRAW HILL FIN. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/moscow/ 
russia-bulgaria-sign-final-investment-decision-8916177. 
 141  Lyubov Pronina & Ali Berat Meric, Turkey Offers Route for Gazprom‘s South Stream Gas 
Pipeline, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=a.TM4QijmIMk. 
 142  Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Gazprom Agrees to Boost Pipeline Capacity, DOWNSTREAM TODAY 
(May 15, 2009), http://downstreamtoday.com/news/article.aspx?a_id=16386&AspxAutoDetect Cookie 
Support=1. 
 143  Emre Peker, Turkey to Sign Agreement for Azerbaijan Gas Pipeline Tomorrow, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 25, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-25/turkey-to-sign-agreement-for-azerbaijan 
-gas-pipeline-tomorrow.html. 
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Austria where it could be further branched out to Western Europe.144  
Although Russia’s main export competitors for the EU market are Norway, 
Algeria, and Qatar, the United States is poised to potentially become a 
player in the market as transmission technology is developed to facilitate 
transportation.145  Russia therefore has a strong interest in limiting other gas 
exporters from entering the EU market and further diluting its market share. 
However, both TANAP and the Nabucco pipeline have faced 
significant problems in the last year.  On June 28, 2013, the Shah Deniz 
Consortium, comprised of the major stakeholders of Azeri gas fields, 
announced that it would be supplying Europe with gas through the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline project⎯connecting Turkey with Greece, Albania, and 
Italy⎯rather than the more expansive Nabucco-West pipeline.146  This 
artery will be connected through the TANAP pipeline, but transmission is 
not expected to begin until 2018 at the earliest.147 
With an obvious need to secure delivery through countries other than 
Ukraine or Belarus, Russia and the EU have become even more closely 
intertwined through investment in recent pipeline projects.  The 
downscaling and failure of pipeline proposals that link the EU with 
Russia’s competitors make diversification of energy suppliers even more 
difficult.  Since the Southern Stream is still in construction and further 
pipeline branches to connect the rest of the EU to the Nord Stream and 
South Stream are still in their planning stages, if the EU is to move away 
from Russian energy dependence, it must do so now.  The trigger for the 
EU to consider pulling the plug on cementing its dependence on Russian 
energy supplies came in the form of unrest in Ukraine. 
 
E.  The Ukrainian Revolution 
 
In November 2013, the EU gas supply was projected to be threatened 
over the winter by Ukrainian failure to store sufficient gas in its 
underground storage facilities.148  Positioning over Ukrainian gas prices 
was again at the forefront of this crisis as Russia continued to use gas 
pricing as a way to control Ukraine’s political alignment; Gazprom had 
 
 144  Bloomberg, Nabucco Venture Sees Iraq as Top Supplier, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (Sept. 30, 
2010), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=nabucco-venture-sees-iraq-as-
top-supplier-2010-09-30. 
 145  RATNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 2–4, 6. 
 146  Shah Deniz Consortium Selects the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) as European Export Pipeline, 
TAP (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.tap-ag.com/news-and-events/2013/06/28/shah-deniz-
consortium-selects-the-trans-adriatic-pipeline-tap-as-european-export-pipeline. 
 147  Maria Snytkova, South Stream Adding Gas to the Fire, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://english.pravda.ru/business/companies/16-03-2014/127112-south_stream-0/. 
 148  Andrew Rettman, Gazprom Warns EU of Winter ‘Catastrophe,’ EUOBSERVER (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://euobserver.com/economic/122122. 
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indicated its willingness to drop gas prices only if Ukraine abandoned plans 
to sign the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement (the 
Association Agreement) and instead signed with the Eurasian Economic 
Community customs union.149  This customs union created an EU-style 
market between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and had sought Ukrainian 
membership since its inception.150  By contrast, the Association Agreement 
would have allowed Ukraine access to many EU resources such as the 
European Investment Bank, EU regulations, and a pathway to visa-free 
movement from Ukraine to the EU.151  While European gas delivery was 
not affected, Ukraine stopped all of its import of Russian gas for several 
days due to an ongoing debate about payments Gazprom claimed were due 
from Ukraine.152 
Ukraine suspended negotiations on the Association Agreement with 
the EU on November 21, 2013.153 On December 17, the President of 
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, 
signed a Ukrainian–Russian action plan that provided for Russian 
investment in Ukrainian Eurobonds and a subsequent lowering of natural 
gas prices to Ukraine.154  Unlike previous exercises of Russian political 
influence over Ukraine, this action sparked massive spontaneous protests in 
Kiev.155  Such protests were exacerbated and brought to the attention of the 
international media when the protestors were violently dispersed by 
Ukrainian police forces.156  With the protestors gaining momentum, Prime 
Minister Mykola Azarov, one of the strongest pro-Russian voices in the 
cabinet, resigned on January 28, 2014.157  Following days of violence and 
 
 149  Id. 
 150  Soviet Union to be Restored in the Form of New Customs Union, KYIVPOST (Dec. 18, 2009), 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/soviet-union-to-be-restored-in-the-
form-of-new-cus-55474.html. 
 151  Association Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and 
Ukraine, of the Other Part, COM (2013) 290 final (May 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2013/029
0/COM_COM(2013)0290(PAR2)_EN.pdf. 
 152  Ukraine Resumes Gas Purchases from Russia – Gazprom, RIA NOVOSTI (Nov. 15, 2013), 
available at http://sputniknews.com/russia/20131115/184735301/Ukraine-Resumes-Gas-Purchases-
From-Russia--Gazprom.html. 
 153  Ukraine Drops EU Plans and Looks to Russia, AL JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 
europe/2013/11/ukraine-drops-eu-plans-looks-russia-20131121145417227621.html (last updated Nov. 
21, 2013). 
 154  Russia Offers Ukraine Major Economic Assistance, BBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25411118 . 
 155  Students in Ukraine Threaten Indefinite National Strike, EURONEWS (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/11/26/students-in-ukraine-threaten-indefinite-national-strike/. 
 156  Brian Whitmore, Ukraine‘s Threat to Putin, ATLANTIC (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/international/archive/2013/12/ukraines-threat-to-putin/282103/. 
 157  Ukraine’s PM Azarov and Government Resign, BBC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25932352. 
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talks, protestors finally took control of Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, as 
President Yanukovych fled to Russia.158  Protestors appointed a new interim 
President, immediately released from jail Yulia Tymoshenko, a staunch 
political opponent of President Yanukovych, and reverted the Ukrainian 
constitution back to the 2004–2010 version (eliminating subsequent 
amendments that had allowed Russian to be used in some regions as a 
second national language).159 
While Ukraine’s interim government has reversed course and is 
actively pursuing a pro-EU stance, the relationship between Russia and the 
EU has notably soured.  In response to the change of government in Kiev, 
the Crimean Oblast and Sevastopol (a city with special status under the 
Ukrainian constitution), both predominantly Russian-speaking areas, voted 
to secede from Ukraine and subsequently held a referendum to join 
Russia.160  Meanwhile, the EU joined the United States and Canada in 
issuing broad sanctions for officials from Russia, Crimea, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States who were accused of orchestrating 
Crimean separatism.161 
In response to the Ukrainian Revolution, Russian-speaking and pro-
Russian elements in the eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and Lugansk 
declared independence from Ukraine.162  The subsequent conflict between 
pro-Russian separatists, allegedly supported by Russian military 
elements,163 has been declared a civil war by the Red Cross164 and has 
exponentially agitated tensions between Russia and the EU over handling of 
the crisis. 
Gas interests have remained an important factor in the Ukrainian 
crisis.  To date, delivery of gas from Russia to the EU through Ukraine has 
been unaffected by the crisis.165  However, with tension between Ukraine 
 
 158  Yuras Karmanou & Angela Charlton, Ukrainian Protestors Claim Control over Capital, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-protesters-claim-control-over-
capital-055501879.html. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Crimea Referendum: Voters ‘Back Russia Union,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097. 
 161  EU Sanctions List Includes Russian Commanders, Crimean PM, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/eu-russia-sanctions-idUSB5N0LP01720140317. 
 162  East Ukrainian Separatists Seek Union with Russia, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27369980 . 
 163  Gabriela Baczynska & Aleksandar Vasovic, Pushing Locals Aside, Russians Take Top Rebel 
Posts in East Ukraine, REUTERS (July 27, 2014),  http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/27/us-
ukraine-crisis-rebels-insight-idUSKBN0FW07020140727. 
 164  Tom Miles, Ukraine War Crimes Trials a Step Closer after Red Cross Assessment, REUTERS (July 22, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/22/us-ukraine-crisis-warcrimes-idUSKBN0FR0V920140722. 
 165  Elena Mazneva & Stephan Bierman, Russia Gas Threat Shows Putin Using Pipes to Press 
Ukraine, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-02/russia-gas-threat-
shows-putin-using-pipelines-to-press-ukraine.html. 
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and Russia unlikely to disperse quickly, Russia is looking to expedite 
construction on the South Stream pipeline to ensure its transmission 
capacity to the EU.166  But the EU has repeatedly threatened to end 
cooperation with Russia on the South Stream pipeline,167 adding further 
uncertainty to a flailing Russian energy market that was hit hard by EU 
sanctions.168 
Meanwhile, domestic gas suppliers like Norway have seen a spiked 
increase in gas demand resulting from the EU–Russia standoff.169  Without 
the pipeline capacity to turn immediately away from Russian energy 
dependence in response to these political concerns, the EU and Russia must 
independently consider whether the ramifications of continuing such a 
political standoff outweigh the economic consequences.  For Russia, the 
economic consequences are the loss of a stable market for its gas exports.  
For the EU, those consequences could include energy shortages. 
 
F.  The Chinese Markets 
 
Russia’s export strategy has shifted in response to political conflicts 
with the West, leading to a stronger focus on eastern markets like China.170  
On May 21, 2014, China signed a deal with Gazprom for an estimated $400 
billion to construct a pipeline and deliver about 4 trillion cubic meters per 
year of gas to China over the next thirty years.171  On the one hand, 
connecting China to Russia’s pipeline system will integrate the eastern and 
western gas markets.172  The pipeline, which broke ground on September 1, 
2014, is expected to be operational in 2019, providing a direct outlet for 
Siberian and Far East gas into China.173  On the other hand, the availability 
of China as a large-scale consumer makes Russian gas a more competitive 
commodity, breaking the monopsony power of Europe over Russia’s export 
market.174 
 
 166  Id. 
 167  South Stream Adding Gas to the Fire, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 6, 2014), http://english.pravda.ru/ 
business/companies/16-03-2014/127112-south_stream-0/. 
 168  Ruble, Stocks Slide over Growing Ukraine Tension, RT (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.webcitation. 
org/6Nq7BJ5FC. 
 169  Ukraine Crisis ‘Awesome‘ for Norway Gas: Analyst, LOCAL (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.the 
local.no/20140303/ukraine-situation-awesome-for-norway-gas. 
 170  Rakteem Katakey, Crimea Crisis Pushes Russian Energy to China from Europe, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/russian-oil-seen-heading-east-not-west-
in-crimea-spat.html. 
 171  Everett Rosenfeld, Why the Russia-China Gas Deal Matters, CNBC (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101693525#. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Putin Breaks Ground on Russia-China Gas Pipeline, World’s Biggest, RT (Sept. 1, 2014), 
http://rt.com/business/184176-russia-china-gas-siberian-power/. 
 174  Rosenfeld, supra note 171. 
CLUNE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/15  7:46 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:199 (2014) 
224 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Analysis 
 
The Roadmap Agreement envisions the continuation and building of 
the current dependence of Europe on Russian natural gas until at least 
2050.175  However, there is an inherent disconnect between the EU’s clearly 
articulated standards for the EU energy market and the practices and ideals 
on which the Gazprom energy market is based upon. 
The EU is committed to building a functioning, integrated network 
infrastructure and open, transparent, efficient, and competitive markets; 
ensuring energy security; and conforming to the goals of sustainable 
development.176  To the EU, a functioning, integrated network 
infrastructure means working towards the development of a smart grid that 
can immediately and sufficiently meet the energy needs of every citizen in 
each member state.  Open, transparent, efficient, and competitive markets 
means the development of a single EU energy market that offers consistent 
electricity pricing due to transparent companies engaged in actual 
competition for consumers.  Energy security means finding a way to ensure 
that the EU can avoid the stoppage crises that have occurred when relations 
between Russia and Ukraine or Belarus have gone sour, leaving the EU to 
suffer the consequences of complete Russian energy dependence.  Finally, 
sustainable development involves developing an energy policy that will 
promote lower carbon emissions and decrease Europe’s contribution to 
climate change. 
Gazprom, and by virtue of its majority ownership, Russia, are clearly 
not in accord with many of these goals.  The accusations levied against 
Gazprom cite Gazprom’s policy of using “destination clauses” to create 
national energy sub-markets for the purpose of discriminatory pricing that 
flies directly in the face of the EU goal of a single energy market.  
Moreover, the corruption and lack of transparency in Russian energy cartels 
has been a consistent problem, and Gazprom fervently resists EU measures 
to end such corrupt practices.  Russia has never shied away from using gas 
prices to incentivize Ukraine and Belarus to act in accordance with Russia’s 
wishes, and conversely, Russia has been accused of punishing countries that 
act against Russian interests.177 
With Russia and the EU demonstrating such diametrically opposed 
interests, the EU’s move to sign the Roadmap Agreement before initiating 
the recent legal action against Gazprom shows the power of the EU’s 
 
 175  Roadmap EU–Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, supra note 51. 
 176  Id. at 5. 
 177  See Valentina Pop, Taking on Gazprom: Lithuania‘s Battle for Energy Independence, 
EUOBSERVER.COM (June 6, 2013), http://euobserver.com/lithuania/120406. 
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competing goals.  Establishing a long-term energy relationship with Russia 
through the Roadmap Agreement is an attempt to lock down much needed 
energy security.  Meanwhile, the legal action shows that the EU is equally 
motivated to enforce the standards to which it holds its energy policy.  Both 
interests have become increasingly acute given the political standoff over 
Ukraine.  The timely handing down of the Yukos Oil arbitration and 
European Court of Human Rights decisions, coupled with the sanctions on 
Russian officials over the Crimean and eastern Ukrainian unrest, have 
shown that the EU is unwilling to compromise its political interests for its 
economic needs.  Likewise, Russia’s investment in China and continued 
support of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine has shown Russia’s growing 
insecurity over Europe’s consumer power.  With these interests in mind, 
there are three possible eventualities for the Russian–EU natural gas trade. 
 
B.  Potential Outcomes 
 
First, the status quo may prevail.  The EU will continue to challenge 
the most egregious of Gazprom’s anticompetitive business practices while 
Gazprom will continue to innovate new ways of extorting enough profits 
from the EU to keep Gazprom profitable.  This situation would likely result 
in neither party feeling that their goals were met.  The EU would not feel 
that it achieved energy security because it would constantly fear that any 
legal action taken against Gazprom could result in stoppages of gas 
deliveries, or that Russia may find a way to utilize the Asian market more 
lucratively and abandon the EU’s energy demands.  With the outcome of 
the Ukrainian unrest still uncertain and alternative pipelines still years from 
completion, returning to the status quo seems both unlikely and 
increasingly fraught with political conflict. 
Second, the EU may prevail and force changes to Gazprom’s business 
practices.  This possibility also presents severe risks.  With Gazprom 
avoiding its profit-generating anticompetitive practices, it would have 
reduced revenues to make the much-needed increases to production 
efficiency to meet the EU demand.178  The EU shares Gazprom’s incentive 
to keep the latter profitable and supply the Central and Eastern European 
member states with natural gas.  The Energy Charter Treaty and the 
Roadmap Agreement have attempted to put in place communication 
mechanisms to allow for greater cooperation between Russia and EU 
consumers, but dispute resolution still too often comes in the form of legal 
arbitration or legal action.179  The EU’s hardline stance on legal matters like 
 
 178  See generally Tensions Threaten Long Standing Natural Gas Partnership Between EU and 
Russia, OILPRICE.COM (Oct. 7, 2013), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Tensions-Threaten-Long-
Standing-Natural-Gas-Partnership-between-EU-and-Russia.html; SARGSYAN ET AL., supra note 83. 
 179  See Tensions Threaten Long Standing Natural Gas Partnership Between EU and Russia, 
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the Yukos Oil dispute combined with economic sanctions over the 
Ukrainian crisis suggest that the EU still perceives this option as a potential 
outcome.  However, given the resource imbalance favoring Russia and the 
new availability of Chinese markets, the EU’s ability to force this outcome 
seems more remote by the day. 
Finally, the EU could find another fuel supplier that would meet its 
standards and offer fuel in a competitive market.  One option for this would 
be Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries which require pipeline 
construction to begin large scale trade.  The Middle East currently has a 
marginal share in Europe’s import market, especially for petroleum, while 
Central Asia has proposed and lost bids for pipeline access throughout 
Europe.  If the EU chooses to abandon Russia as its primary import source 
for energy, it could look to either of these regions to increase their share.  
Alternatively, Europe could increase its use of American coal exports; 
however, coal presents its own environmental risks that threaten EU 
sustainable development goals.  Some have suggested that a future solution 
may be United States entry into the LNG export industry.180  LNG is natural 
gas that has been supercooled into a liquid state for transportation through 
pipelines or shipping.181  Currently, the leading exporters of LNG are Qatar, 
Malaysia, Australia, Nigeria, and Indonesia.182  The United States has 
become largely self sufficient when it comes to fuel sources for electricity 
and is poised to become a net exporter of natural gas within the next four to 
five years.183  The United States currently maintains an export ban on 
natural gas, but the U.S. Department of Energy is considering some export 
licenses which would allow the United States to begin participation in the 
LNG export industry.184  For Russia, this would place greater importance on 
the new Chinese import market for natural gas.  With integration of eastern 
and western pipeline systems scheduled for 2019, Russia would be forced 
to balance its economic interests in export to both Europe and China with 
its disinterest in reforming its internal politics and corporate governance. 
In the meantime, the EU must find a way to stabilize its relationship 
with Gazprom and Russia to provide energy security, which the soft 
commitments of the Roadmap Agreement fail to provide, while bringing 
 
OILPRICE.COM (Oct. 7, 2013), http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Tensions-Threaten-Long-
Standing-Natural-Gas-Partnership-between-EU-and-Russia.html. 
 180  RILEY, supra note 115, at 4. 
 181  Liquefied Natural Gas, CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/deliveringenergy/naturalgas/ 
liquefiednaturalgas/ (last updated Apr. 2012). 
 182  World LNG Report – 2013 Edition 9, INT’L GAS UNION (2013), available at 
http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-field_file/IGU%20-%20World%20LNG%20 
Report%20-%202013%20Edition.pdf. 
 183  Andrew Callus, Interview – U.S. Brings Forward Gas Self-Sufficiency Forecast, REUTERS (Nov. 
13, 2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/13/us-energy-sieminski-idUKL5E8MDCL720121113. 
 184  RILEY, supra note 115, at 4. 
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Gazprom in line with the energy policy the EU has set for the foreseeable 
future, which the current action against Gazprom is very unlikely to 
achieve.  It is still difficult at this juncture to predict the course of the 
Russia–EU natural gas trade.  What had previously been a stable 
relationship of necessity owing to resource imbalance and the captivity of 
both buyer and seller has been thrown into flux.  The Ukrainian conflict and 
the recent legal actions are not the causes of this flux, but rather the result 
of shifting markets and economic interests.  Even without immediately 
available alternatives to Russian gas, the EU has shown its unwillingness to 
be completely vulnerable to Russia’s monopoly supplier power, and Russia 
has countered with alternatives to the EU’s monopsony consumer power.  
Only time will tell who wins this game of chicken. 
 
